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Introduction
3 year on average 20 to 40 million hectoliters of wine have been destroyed (through distillation) -representing 12% to 22% of EU wine production or, in other words, the equivalent of 3 to 6 billion bottles (European Commission, 2006a and ).
There are several remarkable features to wine regulations in the EU. One of the most striking conclusions of economic studies on the EU's wine markets is that the policies have caused -rather than resolved -some major distortions in the wine sector. 3 This, of course, raises some intriguing questions about why these policies have been introduced.
The objective of our paper is to explain why these regulations have been introduced. We will analyze the historical origins of these regulations and relate these to political pressures that resulted from economic developments. Analyzing the historical roots and political motivations of regulations in the EU, how they were introduced and how they have (not) continued to affect current regulations provides interesting insights in the current EU policy regime.
Our paper will also yield some general insights on the political economy of government regulations. 4 The EU wine sector is a fascinating case study because the wine regulations are so pervasive. More than two thousands regulations, directives and decisions on wine have been published since 1962 in the EU. As we will document in the next sections, the main wine framework law of 1962 was reformed five times (Petit, 2000; Council Regulation No 479/2008) . 
Distillation measures involve fairly high EU expenditure. The short-term income support through buying-in of wines for distillation stabilises surplus production in the long-term (…). Additionally, continuous implementation of distillation measures producing industrial alcohol out of wine might be an incentive for higher yields (…)."
4 There is an extensive literature on the political economy of government regulations and public policy. Early contributions are Downs (1957) , Olson (1965) , Stigler (1971) and Becker (1983) . For a review of recent contributions, see Rausser et al. (2011) ; and for applications to food policy and EU agricultural policy see Swinnen (2008 Swinnen ( , 2009 Swinnen ( , 2010 .
As we will argue, some of the regulations were introduced to protect existing rents when these were threatened by innovations or surging imports. Other regulations, however, appear to both enhance welfare (efficiency) and redistribute rents, which makes their analysis both more complex and rich. The case is also particularly insightful because of its long history in regulation. As parts of Europe were the main wine producing region about two millennia ago, it provides a fascinating case of how increased production and innovations have induced regulatory changes.
Conceptual Framework

"That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim in the ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern through all the wine countries." Adam Smith, 1776, Book 1 Chap XI: Of the Rent of Land. pp 216
As we will document in the next section, European policies have tried to regulate both the quantities, prices and qualities of wines. As with many government interventions in other food and agricultural markets, the quantity and price regulations can only be understood from a political perspective, i.e. by analyzing how the political pressures induced by the rents created by the regulation influenced government decision-making. 5 Their primary purpose is to redistribute rents between different groups in society, in particular from (potential) new producers of wine and from consumers of wine to the existing producers. These interventions typically reduce overall welfare and efficiency.
5
In contrast, regulations to guarantee a certain quality of wine, as many products and process standards in general, may increase efficiency and overall welfare. In an environment with asymmetric information between producers and consumers where consumers have imperfect information and high ex-ante monitoring costs about the quality of a certain product, such as wine, government regulations that guarantee a certain quality or safety level, or that reduce information costs, can enhance overall welfare. Similarly, regulations that forbid the use of unhealthy ingredients may increase consumer welfare by reducing/eliminating problems of asymmetric information. For example, some of the early regulations target the dilution of wine with water which hurts consumer interests and producer reputations. 6 However, quality regulations also affect income distribution. Depending on their implementation, they may create rents for certain groups of producers who face fewer costs in implementing certain quality standards of for those who have access to key assets or skills that are required by the regulations. 7 For example, regulations that restrict the production of certain types of (expensive) wines to a certain region will benefit the owners of the fixed factors (such as land and vineyard) in that region and will harm the owners of land and vineyards in neighboring regions.
It is clear that some of the EU wine quality regulations have strong income distributional effects as they require access to very specific assets, such as plots of land in specific regions. In fact, the official EU regulations explicitly specify that "the concept of quality wines in the In historical perspective, this approach to quality regulation in the EU is not an exception, but the rule. In fact, throughout history, quality regulations for wine have been motivated both by efficiency considerations and in order to restrict the production of wines to certain regions (which created rents for land-and vineyard-owners in those regions) or certain technologies (again creating rents). 8 Moreover, even when regulations were primarily introduced for efficiency reasons they have invariably created rents and induced lobbying to keep these regulations in place after their efficiency effects had been mitigated (Meloni and Swinnen, 2012) .
In summary, to understand the existing set of quantity and quality regulations, it is crucial to look at the interactions of political and economic aspects of the regulations.
8 Throughout history, owners of vineyards and wine producers have been among the rich and powerful. Not surprisingly the profits and power of existing wine producers and vineyard owners attracted others to invest in wine production and induced innovations. These new investments and innovations threatened the rents and power of the established vineyard owners and caused protectionist reactions. There are many examples of such political economy processes which resulted in significant regulations in wine markets during Roman times, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance period and in the past few centuries. Whenever changes threatened to reduce their rents, established producers have sought to constrain or outright remove the threat of new developments through political means. They lobbied governments to constrain threats to their rents through regulatory initiatives. Because of their wealth and power they were often successful (see Meloni and Swinnen, 2012) .
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and maximum vineyards yields, the amount of sugar or the additives that can be used -i.e. socalled "oenological practices") and rules on labelling.
Quality regulations were part of the initial wine policy in 1962 12 and have been strengthened since. 13 They apply to both "low quality" (so-called "wines without a Geographical Indication (GI)", previously called "table wines") and "high quality" wines (so-called "wines with a Geographical Indication (GI)", previously called "quality wines").
14
The EU heavily regulates "wines without a GI" and their quality requirements by defining the oenological practices (indicating the recommended/authorized varieties or the maximum enrichment/alcohol per volume allowed), by requiring particular methods of analysis 15 and by restructuring and converting vines. 16 For "wines with a GI" it only sets the minimum legal framework. It is up to each member state to determine its own system of classification and 12 "(…) whereas the common organization must aim at stabilizing markets and prices by adjusting supplies to requirements, such adjustment being directed in particular towards quality production" (Council Regulation (EEC) No 24/1962, Preambles at (3)).
13 Regulations of 1970 Regulations of , 1979 Regulations of , 1987 Regulations of , 1999 Regulations of and 2008 included provisions that strengthen the requirements in order to increase quality.
14 In the pre-2008 system, EU wines were classified into two categories: "quality wines produced in specified regions" (abbreviated to "quality wines") and " Italian IGT) were elevated to the rank of wines with a GI (PGI). Even if the new classification harmonized the wine market with other EU food products that already adopted the PDO/PGI system, member states still have the possibility to use these national classifications on the labels. So far only Romania adopted the PDO/PGI system, casting doubts on the 'simplicity' of the system (Cagliero and Sardone, 2009) . 15 Grapes and musts analysis regards three components, sugar, acid and pH. For instance, for wines without GI, the alcoholic strength ranges between 8.5 and 15 per cent by volume and total acidity content of not less than 3,5 grams per litre. In addition, wine analysis involves alcoholic strength, total acidity, pH, density, residual sugar, and mineral elements, such as iron, copper, sodium and potassium (Robinson, 2006: 22; Council Regulation No 479/2008 (OIV, 2012a) . A name place is thus used to identify the wine and its characteristics, which are thus defined by the delimited geographic area and specific production criteria (so-called "cahier des charges" in France or "disciplinare di produzione" in Italy). 18 These governing rules delimit the geographic area of production, but also determine the type of grape varieties that can be used, the specific wine-making methods, the maximum yield per hectare and the analysis of wines (assessment of organoleptic characteristics -as appearance, color, bouquet and flavor-and a chemical analysis that determines the levels of acidity and alcohol). This implies that the wine's denomination can only be attributed if the grapes are grown and pressed in the delimited region and the wine production process fulfills certain criteria. For instance in the case of "Chianti Classico", specific varieties of grapes have to be grown in one of only nine villages in Italy. In addition to the so-called "quality regulations", the EU has a series of policies that influence the amount and price of wine produced in Europe. Since the start of the EU Common Wine Policy, the EU has imposed minimum prices for wine and organized public intervention in wine markets to deal with surpluses. Surpluses were either stored or distilled into other products with heavy government financing. In addition to distillation and market intervention, the EU 11 wine policy included measures to restrict productions such as restricted planting rights 22 and vineyard grubbing-up schemes.
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Despite these regulations, for decades, the wine market in the EU has been characterized by what is typically referred to, in EU Commission documents, as "structural imbalances", meaning -in layman's terms -the production of vast surpluses of "low quality" wine that nobody wants to buy.
In fact, experts argue that the EU's wine policies, instead of contributing to a solution, have exacerbated the problem. Wyn Grant's (1997) million hectoliters of wine was being distilled every year (see Table 5 ).
Over the years, the EU Commission has launched several attempts to reform its wine policy but has faced stiff resistance from wine producers and political opposition from the member state governments. (European Commission, 2006c , 2006d , 2007a , 2007b , 2007c Cagliero and Sardone, 2009 ). Surpluses would then be eliminated through ex-ante 24 In 1994, the EU Commission attempted to reform the wine market but failed (Maillard, 2002) . The 1994 Uruguay Round agreement resulted in lower tariffs and increased global competition from New World wines coming from South America, Australia and South Africa. In 1999, a new wine CMO was finally adopted, as part of Agenda 2000. The reform confirmed the ban on new vineyard plantings until 2010, changed the distillation policy from compulsory to voluntary distillation (i.e. "crisis" distillation in case of serious and exceptional structural surplus) and introduced restructuring and conversion measures for vineyards (Conforti and Sardone, 2003) . However many problems continued, and the surplus problems were reinforced with decreasing wine consumption in the EU and growing competition (and imports) from New World wines. 25 In years of overproduction, aid for private storage was a support given to winegrowers to store their wine surplus.
26 Export refunds covered the difference between world and EU market prices (European Commission, 2004 Moreover, the available budget 33 would be allocated in national support programmes or envelopes (see Table 2 ), according to national priorities, thereby strengthening the power of the regions. Producers could be compensated through decoupled farm payments (under the so-called
Single Farm Payment scheme which has been implemented in reforms of other commodity market regimes since 2003).
34
The reform was approved in 2007, albeit after significant modifications. Because of strong opposition, some reforms were dropped (e.g. banning enrichment through the addition of sugar), diluted (e.g. grubbing-up was reduced from 400.000 to 200.000 to 175.000 hectares 35 ) or their implementation delayed (e.g. crisis and potable alcohol distillation 36 and use of concentrate grape must will be phased out by 2012) (Gaeta and Corsinovi, 2009 ).
Also on another key element the implementation of the reform was delayed. The
Commission proposed that planting rights restrictions should be removed by 2013 allowing producers to freely decide where to plant. However, the Council decided that current regime on planting new vines will not be lifted until 2018 for the member states wishing to continue the restrictions. However, opponents of the liberalization have since organized themselves to overturn the liberalization decision. The first countries to express their wish to do so were Germany and France in 2010. Since then all EU member states which produce wine have joined in asking for a continuation of plating rights. The countries votes are now close to reaching a qualified majority (EFOW, 2012) .
The difficulties to reform in the face of strong opposition by EU producers is an
interesting -yet hardly innovative -insight. It is well known that regulations breed their own interest groups which attract rents from the regulations and oppose their removal. Moreover, the particularities of the EU decision-making process tend to contribute to a preservation of the status quo 37 (Pokrivcak et al., 2006) .
What is particularly interesting in this case is to look into the historical origins of the EU wine regulations, to see when they were introduced, and why, and how they have persisted or changed since their introduction. A large part of the current EU wine regulations have their roots in French and Italian national regulations prior to the integration in the European Economic Community (EEC) -the predecessor of the EU. In the next sections, we will therefore present a historical perspective on the political economic origins of some of the key regulatory interventions in Europe. Since, as we will argue in detail further, it is particularly the French regulations which played a crucial role in shaping EU wine policies, we start by analyzing the roots and causes of the key French wine regulations. Warner (1960) , Lachiver (1988) , Loubère (1978 and 1990) , Ulin (1996) and Simpson (2011) . 40 Wine employed one and a half million family winegrowers, contributed to about one-sixth of France's revenues and was the second export after textiles (Paul, 1996:9) . 41 Ordish (1987) , Paul (1996) and Gale (2003 Gale ( , 2011 extensively analyzed the causes and cures for Phylloxera. 42 Before Phylloxera, about 2.3 million hectares were planted with vines. By 1900, vineyard surface dropped to about 1.6 million hectares, with replanted vines reaching 1.2 million hectares (Lachiver, 1988) . 43 The remedies included flooding vineyards, chemical treatments (as carbon disulfide) or natural brews made, for instance, with tobacco or sea salt (Tyman, 1879; Paul, 1996) . exports to France reaching 3.5 million hectoliters in 1897. French imports of wine rose from 0.1 million hectoliters in 1870 to 12 million hectoliters in 1888 (Isnard, 1947; Augé-Laribé, 1950) .
However, by the beginning of the 20 th century, French vineyards were gradually reconstructed and production recovered thanks to hybrid grape varieties and grafting. 45 The first solution -hybrids -was found by crossing two or more varieties of different vine species.
Hybrids were either the result of genetic crosses between American vine species (so-called "American direct-production hybrids" 46 ) or between European and American vine species (socalled "French hybrids"). The second solution -grafting 47 -consisted in inserting European vines on to the roots of the Phylloxera resistant American vine species (Paul, 1996; Gale, 2011) .
The solutions to Phylloxera led to two new problems. First, French domestic production recovered and cheap foreign wines now competed with French wines, thus leading to lower prices. Second, as a reaction to low prices two types of quality problems became common:
imitations of brand-name wines to capture higher value markets and adulterations to compete with cheap wine imports. Examples of imitations were the production of false "Burgundy wines"
or "Bordeaux wines", labeled and sold as Burgundy or Bordeaux but produced in other parts of France. Examples of wine adulteration were that producers used wine by-products at the maximum capacity (for instance by adding water and sugar to grape skins, the piquettes), or 45 The initial search focused on chemical treatments. Carbon disulfide managed to temporally halt the vines' destruction, but it was expensive. Scientists continued to search for cheaper and long-lasting solutions (Loubère, 1978 and 1990) .
46 These "American hybrids", as Clinton, Isabelle and Noah, were developed in the US at the beginning of the 19 th century. They were directly planted into the French soil as a first solution to the vine diseases. However, by 1890-1900, due to their low resistance to Phylloxera, they were replaced by either grafting or Euro-American hybrids (Couderc, 2005 The French government introduced a series of laws aimed at restricting supply and regulating the quality of the wines. A 1889 law first defined wine as a beverage made of the fermented juice of grapes, thereby excluding wines made from dried grapes (Milhau, 1953) . A 1905 law aimed at eliminating frauds on wine characteristics and on their origins. 49 This law and a series of other laws also tried to regulate "quality" by introducing an explicit link between the "quality" of the wine, its production region (the terroir) and the traditional way of producing wine. In this way, the regional boundaries of Bordeaux, Cognac, Armagnac and Champagne wines were established between 1908 and 1912. 50 These regional boundaries were referred to as
Appellations.
A few years later, in 1919, a new law specified that if an Appellation was used by unauthorized producers, legal proceedings could be initiated against its use. Later, the restrictions grew further: a 1927 law placed restrictions on grape varieties and methods of viticulture used for the Appellations wine (Loubère, 1990) . Not surprisingly these regulations 48 In 1887, sugar wines and dried grapes wines accounted for 11% of total wine production (Insee, 1935 and . 49 A 1907 law forbade mouillage (addition of water) and sucrage (addition of sugar) of wines (Legifrance, 2011).
50 These laws were also the result of the winegrower's revolt in the South of France and in the Champagne region. Their collective political activities consisted of pressuring politicians through through street protests and even violence. For example, in the early 20 th century, during their "revolutionary phase", winegrowers imposed their opinions with so-called actions directes, which included mutinies, pillages, burning down of city halls with deaths and injuries as a consequence (Bonal, 1984; Martin, 1998; Bagnol, 2007; Jacquet, 2009; Wolikow, 2009). were heavily supported by representatives of the Appellations regions who held key positions in parliament. 51 Finally, in 1935, a law created the Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées (AOC) -which formed the basis for the later EU quality regimes. The law combined several of the earlier regulations: it restricted production not only to regional specific origins (through areas' delimitation) but also to specific production criteria as grape variety, minimum alcohol content and maximum vineyards yields (adding the "Controlled" adjective to the "Appellation of Origin" concept). Moreover, the Comité National des Appellations d'Origine (National Committee for Appellations of Origin), a government branch established to administer the AOC process for "high quality" wines, was established (Stanziani, 2004; Simpson, 2011) .
52
Somewhat paradoxically, instead of reducing the number of Appellations, the 1935 system encouraged the creation of AOC wines in France. In 1931, the Statut Viticole tightly regulated French table wines while the Appellations of Origin wines were exempted from it. This induced many table wines producers to ask for an upgrading to the higher wine category. The share of Appellation wines production increased from 17% in 1931 to 30% in 1980s and to 50% in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012) .
The battle over hybrid vines Underlying these increasingly tight "quality" regulations in France was a major battle over the regulation of hybrids, one of the two practices used to cure vines from Phylloxera. This 51 In 1919, Joseph Capus was elected deputy of the Gironde (the Bordeaux wines production area) and he was also the president of the Parliamentary committee called «des grands crus» (great vintages). were more productive, easier to grow and more resistant to diseases. They required less winegrowing experience, less pesticides and less capital (Paul, 1996) .
However, these diverging interests were not equally represented. (Paul, 1996:100) . 54 The creation of these associations was promoted by the 1884 French law that legalized labor unions (Simpson, 2011) . 55 Champagne houses (the Grandes Marques as Veuve Clicquot or Moët&Chandon) were producers (négotiants) that acquired grapes and established long-term contracts with winegrowers throughout the Champagne region, thereby undertaking the high costs and risks of elaborating cuvées. Even nowadays, two third of the sales and 90 per cent of the exports is done by around 100 Champagne houses owning 4 000 ha, or 12.5% of the land (Union des Maisons de Champagnes, 2012 (Capus, 1947) . 58 Methyl alcohol was supposed to drive people mad; nowadays it's an obsolete argument. Moreover, the fact that the first experimental French hybrids gave undrinkable wines certainly influenced the mind of winegrowers and consumers, thereby inducing suspicious reactions to the new technology. Indeed, it took almost 30 years to German researchers, at the Geilweilerhof Institute for Grape Breeding, to breed the new cultivar Regent. This non-vinifera variety is part of a new generation of hybrids (called "disease-resistant varieties") that can compete with "high quality" wines, with the advantage of being more resistant to diseases and less pollutant since agrochemicals are not used. Furthermore, researchers have not found essential differences in characteristics between vinifera and nonvinifera varieties ( 
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never had a strong wine tradition took advantage of it (Milhau, 1953) . By the end of the 1950s, hybrids occupied one third of France's total vine area and represented 42 per cent of table wines (see Figure 1 ; Paul, 1996) .
The Statut Viticole
Other factors also played a role in inducing more regulations. While import restrictions had reduced imports from Spain, Italy and Greece, 59 vineyards continued to expand in Algeria and to put pressure on the French market. Algerian wine production doubled from 7 million hectoliters in 1920 to 14 million hectoliters in 1930 (Milhau, 1953 (Munholland, 2006; Sagnes, 2009 (Critz, Olmstead and Rhode, 1999; Pinilla and Ayuda, 2002; Pinilla and Serrano, 2008) . 60 As the Appellation producers were represented by Joseph Capus in the French Parliament, the growers of "table wines" had Édouard Barthe, a pharmacist who became a powerful deputy of Hérault in the Languedoc region (from 1910 to 1942) . He played an important role in the adoption of the Statut Viticole.
61 Producers could allocate their product in the market through successive quotas.
62 Between 1934 and 1935 , 24 million hectoliters were distilled (Lachiver, 1988) 63 The policy was biased towards supporting smaller French winegrowers and hurting larger Algerian winegrowers. It introduced taxation on high yields declaring more than 400 hectoliters, new planting of vines were forbidden for ten years for vineyards of more than 10 hectares and distillation was obligatory for winegrowers producing more than 80 hectoliters per hectare (Lachiver, 1988; Birebent, 2007; Simpson, 2011). 22 (Gavignaud, 1988; Loubère, 1990) . The grubbing-up measure proved to be inefficient despite its substantive premium (up to 7000 francs per hectare) because mostly old and unproductive vines were uprooted with little effect on total production (Milhau, 1953) .
During War World II there was a reversal of policies because of wine shortages. French production stagnated during the decade of the 1940s due to massive vineyard destructions and in 1942, under the German-occupied France, the Statut Viticole was repealed.
After the war, wine demand grew rapidly and supply was still lower. This resulted in high prices which encouraged major vineyards' replanting. In the following years, wine production increased strongly, also because young vines were more productive than older ones. The increase in wine production reduced prices again and soon resulted in new pressure for political interventions. The Statut Viticole was reintroduced in 1953, under the name Code du Vin. The law reestablished subsidies to uproot vines, 65 as well as surplus storage, compulsory distillation, and penalties for high yields. It also created the viticultural land register (Milhau, 1953; Malassis, 1959; Munsie, 2002) . Again, it turned out that the grubbing-up measure was not very effective since it apparently only worked in the French departments that already witnessed a decrease of the vineyard area 66 (Bartoli, 1986) .
Finally, the pressure of the AOC producers was ultimately successful in removing the hybrid grapes from France through government regulations. However, this took another few decades and, importantly, the extension of heavy regulation under the EEC (later EU). Through a 64 The unpopularity of the last measure forced the French government to introduce in 1934 a grubbing-up premium (Gavignaud, 1988) . 65 The French decree 53/977 of 1953 established -on average-a premium of 2700 francs per hectare (Bartoli, 1986) . Between 1953 and 1957, 5 per cent (54.000 hectares) of the total vine area benefited from this measure. 66 The grubbing-up measure was temporary removed in 1957, following grape losses due to frosts (Bartoli, 1986) .
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combination of subsidized grubbing-up and specific planting rights, the amount of "hybrid" vines in the country was dramatically reduced. AOC pressure groups continued to lobby the French government, and later the EU Council, in order to obtain the removal of hybrid grapes.
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the uprooting of "undesirable vines" was subsidized.
Authorized hybrids were possible but planting rights were reduced by 30 per cent 67 (Crowley, 1993) . Moreover, with the EEC Directives 627/78 and 458/80 this trend increased. Ultimately, these policies were successful in largely removing hybrid wines. By subsiding the replanting of allowed varieties, 100.000 hectares of hybrids were removed in the 1960s and 225.000 hectares in the 1970s. This made that, by the end of the 1980s, less than 3 per cent of French vines were hybrids (Crowley, 1993) . In the next section, we explain how French regulations were taken over by the EU.
European Integration and the Creation of the EU Wine Policy
68
Among the initial six members of the EEC, four countries produced wine (Luxembourg, West
Germany, Italy and France). Especially for Italy and France, wine was an important commodity.
Both were also major wine exporters. With Italy producing 49% and France 47%, together they produced 96% of the total EEC wine supply. Germany produced only 4% (Newsletter on the Common Agricultural Policy, 1969).
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The pre-EEC domestic policies of France and Italy vis-à-vis their wine sectors both included regulations but differed. As we explained before, France's wine market was highly regulated by government interventions, including prohibitions on new vineyards, wine classification systems, price supports, compulsory distillation, chaptalization, etc. (Niederbacher, 1983; Kortteinen, 1984) . Italy had a more liberal policy regime: there were no price interventions or plantation restrictions, but the Italian government did provide tax advantages to distill wine surpluses and imposed restrictions on imports from non-EEC countries 69 (Newsletter on the Common Agricultural Policy, 1969; Smith, de Maillard and Costa, 2007:80) .
Economic integration required the integration of both policy regimes in one EU wine policy (the CMO for wine). An initial EEC regulatory step towards such common market was taken in 1962. 70 It required that each member state establish a viticultural land register; 71 the notification of annual production levels to central authority (harvest and stock declarations); the annual compilation of future estimates of resources and requirements; 72 and stricter rules on "quality wines" (defined as wines with a GI).
Initially, the CMO refrained from stronger regulations. 73 The EU's policies focused strongly on "table wines" as these represented the vast majority of the wines, and most problems were in that segment of the market. During the 1960s, table wines accounted for 95% of the total EU production, while now they account for approximately 50% (Smith, de Maillard and Costa, 2007:81; Eurostat, 2012) .
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had to deal with their internal surpluses and large inflows of Algerian wine on the French market due to a French-Algerian treaty. After the Algerian independence in 1962, France guaranteed to purchase considerable quantities of Algerian wine, i.e. 39 million hectoliters in five years (Isnard, 1966 77 and common rules on labelling and "oenological practices" (Petit, 2000; European Commission, 2006b ).
These set of regulations were in response to French demands. However, due to pressure from the more liberal Italian side, the EEC wine policy did not restrict planting rights and did not impose grubbing-up -although anyone wishing to plant/replant vines had to notify it to the 74 Also in other agricultural commodities, such as grains, dairy and oilseeds, there was a transition period of approximately ten years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome (in 1957) before a common market organization was fully implemented. 75 Private storage aid was granted if the average price remained less than the government-set "threshold price" for two consecutive weeks. Distillation of table wines was enacted if the aid to private storage proved to be insufficient in stabilizing market. In addition, the new wine policy provided government subsidies to distillers to compensate them for minimum prices paid to wine producers (which were above market prices), and subsidies for the private storage of this alcohol. Trade with third countries was also regulated through government-set minimum import prices and tariffs.
76 Robinson (2006) defines enrichment as a "wine-making operation whereby the fermentable sugars of grape juice or must are supplemented in order to increase the alcoholic strength of the resultant wine". "Chaptalization" refers to the addition of sugar, whereas enrichment also encloses other additives.
competent authority 78 (Council Regulation No 816/70) . The latter requirement closely followed pre-EEC policies of France, Germany and Luxembourg where growers had to acquire official permission in order to plant vines (Newsletter on the Common Agricultural Policy, 1970).
Hence, the final version of the EEC Common Wine Policy, agreed in 1970, was considerably more interventionist than the Italian wine regime, but still less regulated than the old French wine policies. However, it turned out to be only a matter of time until the EEC Wine
Policy was adjusted and the French interventionist approach totally dominated.
As could be foreseen, the 1970 Wine Policy, with its minimum prices and intervention buying of wine, did not solve the problems. In several ways it made the problems of oversupply of French wine worse. Cheaper Italian wine production grew rapidly and increasingly substituted French wine. 79 In addition, with minimum prices, total wine production increased in the EEC and surpassed EEC consumption, causing growing surpluses (see Table 6 ). Under pressure from 79 French wine prices were on average 25% higher compared to the Italian ones. In the 1969/70 wine year, Italy exported 4 million hectoliters of table wine to France, which represented 90% of French's wine imports in volume terms (Arnaud, 1991) .
80 Especially "table wine" growers of the Midi region in Southern France.
81 171 and 161 million hectolitres were produced respectively in the 1973 and 1974 harvests instead of the normal 135-140 million hectolitres (Niederbacher, 1983 ).
a French tax was levied on imported Italian wine and the EEC again intervened in the wine markets by distilling 19.6 million hectoliters of wine in four years (from 1973/74 to 1975/76 In short, by 1979, just a few years after the introduction of a common wine market in the EEC, the French wine policy with its extensive regulations and heavy government interventions in markets had become the official European wine policy.
The EEC's initial system of quality regulations explicitly referred to (and integrated) the (table wines) . However, this permanent regime was repeatedly prolonged and was extended to wines with a GI.
83 EC Regulation 1163/76 introduced a system of subsidies for producers to either abandon vineyards for 6 years or to grub-up vineyards and replace them with other crops. 84 The French system of Appellations of Origin had already influenced other countries policies through earlier international agreements. For instance Italy and Spain integrated the notion of Appellation of Origins respectively in 1930 and 1932. However, also here the Italian and Spanish regulations were less interventionist than the French, only guaranteeing the origin of the product and not the production practices, as in the French system (Estatuto del Vino, 1932; Federdoc, 2012) .
Controllata" (DOC) and the "Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita" (DOCG).
With the integration of other wine-producing nations in the EU such as Greece in 1980, Spain Regulations determine where certain wines can be produced and where not, the minimum distances of vines, the type of vines that can be planted in certain regions, yield restrictions, etc.
In addition, public regulations determine subsidies to EU producers and wine distillation schemes. The EU also determines public subsidies to finance grubbing-up (i.e. uprooting) schemes to remove existing vineyards, and imposes a limit on the planting of new vineyards.
In this paper we have documented these regulations and analyzed the historical origins of these regulations. The introduction of many regulations followed the integration of markets and forces of globalization, technological changes and resulting political pressures.
Many of the current EU regulations can be traced back to French regulations in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century. "Quality" regulations, as the AOC system, were introduced to protect producers of "quality wines", such as wealthy landowners of Bordeaux, from imitations and adulterations. Quantity regulations, as planting restrictions, were introduced to protect French producers from cheap wines imports.
With the integration of France into the EU some of the policies were initially liberalized.
However, surplus crises in the 1970s caused strong pressures from French producers to reinstall the regulations and extend them to the EU as a whole. As in 1931, when wine producers of the Midi (which were threatened by the import of Algerian wines) managed to pressure the French government to introduce the Statut Viticole, regulating the production of wines, French producers in 1976 (threatened this time by the import of Italian wines) managed to pressure their government and EU leaders to introduce more regulations for wines. No 24/1962 (20 April, 1962 Source: Crowley, 1993 .
ANNEXES Annex 1: An example of an Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée regulation, applied to Bordeaux Wines
The Cahier des charges de l'Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée "Bordeaux Supérieur" is a document of 51 pages settling out the governing rules of production, vinification and bottling of the AOC. The document is available online at http://agriculture.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/AOC_DGPAAT_SOMM42-2.pdf
The main rules that local winegrowers have to restrict themselves to regard: a) Territory: the specific area is defined in which the harvest/vinification/bottling has to be carried out. A list of approximately 500 communes are specified in the Gironde territory; b) Authorized grape varieties: grapes have to grow within the specified geographical region.
For example, for the red Bordeaux wines, only 6 varieties are permitted, namely Cabernet Sauvignon -Cabernet Franc-Merlot -Cot (or Malbec) -Carmenère -Petit Verdot; c) Growing and winemaking methods, as:
-maximum number of vines per hectare (4500 plant per hectare); -distance between rows (not more than 2.20 meters) and between vines (not less than 0.85 meter); -pruning methods. For instance for the Merlot variety, the number of fruiting branches per plant cannot exceed 11 shoots per vine; -the fence height must be at least equal to 0.55 times the spacing between rows. d) the minimum natural alcoholic strength (in % of volume) must be 11% for red wines; e) the maximum yield allowed (50 hectoliters per hectare); f) the bottling and labelling: wines must age for at least 12 months before they can be sold; and the label must indicate Bordeaux Supérieur together with the Appellation Contrôlée reference.
